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Abstract
Asylum seekers in South Africa experience extreme diffi  cul-
ties lodging their claims at the Department of Home Aff airs. 
Th is paper utilizes new survey data to measure the extent 
of the Department’s failures to provide access to the status 
determination process. Th e principal fi nding is that South 
African offi  cials oft en go out of their way to prevent asylum 
seekers from entering the system. Th is provides support for 
the argument the Department is beholden to an institution-
al culture of immigration protectionism. Th is assessment 
diff ers from conventional analyses of poor African perform-
ance of status determination which emphasize issues of cor-
ruption and institutional capacity.
Abstract
Les demandeurs d’asile en Afrique du Sud rencontrent des 
diffi  cultés extrêmes  pour présenter leurs demandes au 
Département des aff aires intérieures. Cet article utilise des 
données d’un nouveau sondage pour mesurer l’étendue des 
manquements du Département vis-à-vis de son devoir de 
rendre accessible le processus de détermination du statut. 
La conclusion principale est que les autorités Sud africaines 
s’évertuent souvent pour empêcher les demandeurs d’asile 
d’accéder au système. Cela semble soutenir l’allégation que 
le Département est prisonnier d’une culture institutionnelle 
de protectionnisme en matière d’immigration. Cette évalua-
tion se démarque des analyses conventionnelles de la mau-
vaise performance africaine en matière de détermination 
du statut qui, elles, soulignent des problèmes de corruption 
et de manque de capacité institutionnelle.
You get stepped on. You are tired, you are bored and thirsty. 
You feel like you are dead and not human anymore.1
Introduction
Responding to a perceived need to prevent unwanted migra-
tion since the 1980s, many developed countries have insti-
tuted measures to limit access to asylum. While status de-
termination processes and procedures in Africa have usually 
departed signifi cantly from “best (and worst) practices” in the 
Global North, countries on the continent have taken a similar 
turn towards more limited access.2 However, the provisions 
and procedures utilized by African states towards this end 
have diff ered from European, Asian, and North American 
counterparts. Th e main diff erences in developments on the 
continent need to be understood within the diff erent body of 
international instruments which govern refugee protection, 
in particular the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
Convention governing the Specifi c Aspects of the Refugee 
Problem in Africa (the OAU Convention). Th e Convention 
envisages a framework of protection that takes into account 
the unique character of refugee fl ows in the continent and 
the unique capabilities of African states, providing specifi c-
ally for group based or prima facie determination systems.3 
Despite these diff erences, status determination in Africa is 
not entirely diff erent in character from counterparts else-
where. While group based and UNHCR implemented deter-
mination systems are far more prominent across the region, 
status determination models in Africa oft en share important 
features with practices outside the continent. While it is un-
likely that jurisprudence in non-African countries will ever 
aff ord much attention to African courts’ interpretations of 
key provisions in the UN Refugee Convention, status deter-
mination issues in African countries will almost certainly 
impact upon developments and debates elsewhere, given 
the continent’s disproportionate share of the world’s refugee 
population.
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It is in this respect that the South African case is par-
ticularly interesting. South Africa is currently attempting to 
meet a relatively ambitious and recent set of refugee commit-
ments. Th e transition to democratic rule and relative stability 
in the 1990s saw the end of an era in which the Republic was 
both an international pariah and prominent refugee sending 
country. Over the last two decades, South Africa has acced-
ed to international refugee conventions and passed its own 
Refugees Act (no. 130 of 1998). In doing so, the post-Apart-
heid government eschewed some of the hallmarks of African 
asylum policies (e.g., camps, group determination, delega-
tion of responsibility to UNHCR)4 relatively early on, opting 
for a self-settlement model of protection accompanied by in-
dividualized status determination procedures.5 Th e process 
of craft ing the laws to defi ne how this decision-making pro-
cess would be administered was highly transparent and drew 
heavily on the expertise of, and inputs from, civil society and 
international non-governmental organizations. Th e result 
was a reception and status determination system containing 
strong procedural safeguards for applicants and a variety of 
institutional checks and balances on the decision-making 
process. Th ese protections are buttressed by South Africa’s 
progressive constitution and policed by a robust commun-
ity of civil society monitors and legal service providers that 
possess considerable interest in migration issues, funding for 
projects around status determination and protection, and 
the capacity to demand compliance with the country’s new 
refugee laws.6 In these respects, and on paper, South Africa 
stands out as a Global North-style status determination sys-
tem, albeit located in the Global South.
Given the considerable promise of this nascent experi-
ment in status determination, the current state of disarray in 
South Africa’s refugee reception system is particularly con-
cerning. South Africa possesses a large and growing back-
log of undetermined asylum claims.7 As is alluded to in the 
opening quotation, and will be documented in this piece, 
asylum seekers in South Africa experience extreme diffi  cul-
ties and trauma in the simple act of attempting to enter a 
refugee reception offi  ce and lodge their claim. Given the sig-
nifi cant diff erences between these conditions and conditions 
at similar offi  ces in Europe and North America it is worth 
beginning with a thick description drawn from Lawyers for 
Human Rights (LHR) monitoring at the Gauteng offi  ces:
Rarely does an asylum seeker gain entry to a refugee reception 
offi  ce on their fi rst attempt. Th e offi  ce accepts a limited number 
of applications per day. Entitlement to one of these positions is 
controlled by a hazy coalition of security guards, migrant agents, 
interpreters and offi  cials who solicit bribes and favours in return 
for favourable treatment and employ oblique force against those 
who would challenge the integrity of their parallel system. Th ose 
who do not have the capacity to pay have a choice; well, a choice 
that is not really a choice. Th ey can return at a later date and risk 
being caught by the police without documentation, or they can 
sleep overnight outside the offi  ce and retain their place in the 
offi  cial queue. On the nights when LHR did headcounts they 
discovered between 80 and 300 people sleeping outside the of-
fi ce. At night armed criminals visit the site. Incidents of theft  are 
common. Th ere have been several reports of rape. Th ere is no 
shelter in the vicinity of the offi  ce and people oft en endure rain 
and very cold conditions while waiting outside. Women sleep 
with babies by their side. On some occasions the police have vis-
ited during the night and arrested asylum seekers or extorted 
them for bribes. Fights about places in the queue are common at 
night, sometimes degenerating into the throwing of bricks and 
stones and leading to several cases of hospitalisation. Eff orts to 
normalise conditions of shelter outside the offi  ce have been re-
sisted by offi  cials. On at least one occasion the City of Tshwane 
arrived in the morning to clear all temporary shelters, bedding, 
and belongings of people gathered outside the offi  ce.
In the morning, people waiting outside begin to form themselves 
into queues. Agents, security guards and interpreters are heav-
ily involved, making off ers and explaining how people will be 
received on that day. No-one knows at this point how they will 
be received, who will be chosen and how many will gain entry. 
Sometimes it is elderly women, sometimes Malawians only, 
sometimes 40, sometimes 100. Th e police will arrive and on oc-
casions make arrests. Sometimes people seek to fl ee the police 
and there have been at least two deaths caused by people at-
tempting to escape, only to run headlong into the morning traf-
fi c. Th ere will also be beatings; by the police, by security guards; 
on occasions by street vendors who join in. On one occasion 
at Rosettenville offi  ce, asylum seekers have been sprayed with 
water guns. On another occasion they were simply hosed down 
by a security guard. Almost everyone is in a heightened state 
of anxiety and there is invariably a great deal of pushing, shov-
ing and then more fi ghts, particularly when the gangs control-
ling entry pick people out of the queue or place their members 
at a privileged point in line. Th e new asylum seekers are soon 
joined by a steady stream of people waiting for renewals, who 
form something more closely resembling a queue. Since these 
people are only waiting for a stamp and not to fi ll in forms, they 
will usually all be served, though when they will be served var-
ies, sometimes waiting for 2 hours, sometimes for 24 hours. All 
this occurs in a venue that reeks of urine and sweats with human 
anticipation and fear. All of this occurs before anyone has seen a 
Home Aff airs offi  cial.
It is tempting to explain these problems in the recep-
tion system purely in terms of a mismatch between legal 
framework and geographic context. According to this line 
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of argument, individualized status determination models 
and Refugee Convention protection systems are not suited 
to Africa, where countries ordinarily experience conditions 
of mass infl ux from neighbouring countries and rarely pos-
sess the adequate bureaucratic resources or legal expertise to 
process these populations. Th is line of thinking is refl ected in 
Toby Mendel’s work on Tanzania, which ponders whether “it 
is time to recognise that the 1951 Convention is simply not 
the right instrument for poor countries hosting large num-
bers of refugees.”8 Various facets of refugee reception in South 
Africa support a similar assessment of conditions there. Over 
the past six years the country has consistently received over 
30,000 applications for asylum per year. Given that these fi g-
ures are produced by offi  ces which set fi xed quotas on the 
number of asylum claims received per day, the total number 
of asylum seekers entering the country is almost certainly 
higher. As the political and economic climate in Zimbabwe 
has deteriorated, hundreds of thousands of people from that 
country have been displaced across the border into South 
Africa, and at the time of writing it is highly plausible to 
suggest that more will come. Although the African National 
Congress (ANC) has passed a wide range of very progressive 
laws on a variety of human rights issues since taking govern-
ment, lack of capacity and budget has meant that it has failed 
to deliver on many of its promises. Furthermore, the spread of 
corruption through the bureaucracy has consistently handi-
capped the government’s ability to deliver essential services 
to desperately poor populations in the townships, let alone 
non-nationals in need. Many critics, including the members 
of the ANC leadership, have identifi ed problems of capacity 
and corruption in the refugee reception system.9 Th e fi nd-
ings of this study support the idea that these characteristic-
ally “African” refugee governance problems have contributed 
to the dilapidated state of status determination processes in 
South Africa. Limited capacity and corruption do not, how-
ever, tell the whole story.
Th is study suggests that explaining conditions of access 
to status determination in South Africa requires us to pay 
more attention to the institutional culture of the government 
agency with primary responsibility for implementing refu-
gee laws: the Department of Home Aff airs (DHA). Th e study 
shows that, far from being simply the product of high demand 
or offi  cials’ predilection for with illicit remuneration, the 
barriers to asylum in South Africa are commonly produced 
by the individual eff ort of offi  cials of the DHA, who act out-
side their legislative mandate to prevent asylum seekers gain-
ing access to the reception system. While the methodology 
employed by this study does not allow for an explanation of 
precisely why offi  cials behave in this manner, there is a range 
of evidence available from other archival, monitoring, and 
research work to generate a compelling hypothesis as to why 
this may be the case. Th is paper aff ords primary weight to the 
factor of institutional culture. Put simply, the DHA offi  cials 
are embedded in an institution which sanctions its offi  cials 
engaging in extralegal practices that prevent foreigners from 
entering and residing legally in South Africa. Th is culture, 
which has its roots in the DHA’s Apartheid days, continues 
to inform how agents of the Department understand their 
responsibilities to new laws, and plays a considerable role in 
limiting access to asylum and undermining the integrity of 
the status determination system.
Th e paper will make this case in four parts. Th e fi rst section 
outlines the principal characteristics of South Africa’s refugee 
status determination system, paying specifi c attention to the 
key legislative responsibilities of the DHA. Section two intro-
duces the methodology. Here, I explain why we chose to sur-
vey applicants at the reception offi  ces. Section three analyzes 
the survey data and reveals the failure of the Department to 
meet its legal obligations. Section four attempts to explain 
these failures by looking at the institutional history of the 
DHA and some key events during the brief history of the 
administration of the Refugees Act. Th is section illustrates 
senior management’s promotion of a culture of defensiveness 
towards asylum claims.
South Africa’s Status Determination System
South Africa’s refugee status determination system is the 
product of an ongoing and oft en ad hoc eff ort to respond to 
new refugee fl ows and commitments through an ongoing 
process of design, implementation, consultation, and reform. 
Th is process began with the signing of a series of agreements 
between 1991 and 1993 with the UNHCR and the government 
of Mozambique to create arrangements for the repatriation of 
Mozambican nationals who had fl ed the civil war in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Aft er the transition to democratic rule 
in South Africa, the ANC government acceded to the OAU 
Convention (1995) and then to the United Nations Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol (1996). Th e Refugees Act 
was passed by Parliament in 1998 and, aft er some contesta-
tion of the terms of its implementing Regulations, came 
into eff ect in 2000. Th e details of the process leading to the 
passage of the Act have been dealt with elsewhere.10 For 
our purposes, it is important to note the progressive polit-
ical context in which the government established its com-
mitments to a refugee agenda. Many members of the ruling 
ANC had been hosted by neighbouring countries as exiles 
of Apartheid South Africa and had strong personal reasons 
to support a reciprocal policy. In this context, the objective 
of Mozambican repatriation and regularization, which occu-
pied much of the early refugee policy-making debates, repre-
sented an opportunity to assist a faithful ally, and not simply 
aff ord protection to foreign nationals in need. Following this, 
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the late 1990s represented an extremely progressive policy-
making phase in South Africa for human rights. Not only did 
South Africa translate its Freedom Charter, with promises of 
protections for all living within its borders, into a new set of 
constitutional rights; it also signed up to a raft  of internation-
al legislation on human rights and passed a wide range of do-
mestic implementing laws. Th is spirit was not only refl ected 
in the types of laws South Africa introduced, but extended 
to the way it designed new policy frameworks. Th e Refugees 
Act was draft ed and passed through a series of consultative 
processes in which civil society representatives and consult-
ants were heavily involved and their inputs oft en translated 
directly into statutory provisions and policy outcomes.
Th e principal outcome of this progressive policy-making 
process was a set of refugee laws which included a variety of 
procedural safeguards for asylum seekers. Th e refugee recep-
tion system envisaged in the legislation consists of four parts: 
entry, application, hearing, and documentation. Put simply, 
it is expected that an individual will register their intention 
to apply on entry; proceed directly to an offi  ce in the inter-
ior to make an application; and subsequently sit an interview 
with an offi  cial who will determine the claim; and it also is 
expected that the applicant will receive documentation valid-
ating their right to be in the country until the entire process 
is complete. Th e legislation and its regulations outline provi-
sions to promote access to each stage of the status determina-
tion process. Th e fi rst issue is the Act’s protection of appli-
cants’ right to freely enter South Africa to make their claim. 
Th e legislation sets out a geographically bifurcated process 
whereby (a) applicants register their intention to apply for 
asylum either at their point of entry or fi rst encounter with 
a government offi  cial;11 and (b) applicants formally lodge 
their applications in the country’s interior.12 Th ese provi-
sions envisage a process whereby the various police, army, 
and ordinary DHA offi  cials who man the border and border 
posts assume collective responsibility to ensure that new ar-
rivals’ intentions to make asylum claims are acknowledged. 
Th e DHA offi  cials alone are responsible for issuing tempor-
ary permits and directing applicants towards sites where they 
can formally lodge a claim. Th e Act made specifi c provision 
for the establishment of refugee reception offi  ces (RROs) for 
this latter purpose13 where offi  cials must receive the asylum 
seeker’s claim.14
Th e second set of provisions attempts to ensure that claims 
are made at the RROs in a free, transparent, and accurate 
manner. Th e DHA is responsible for ensuring that the RROs 
are staff ed by trained Refugee Reception Offi  cers15 who are 
responsible for:
verbally notifying the applicant of their rights and • 
obligations;16
assisting applicants to properly complete their • 
forms;17
providing competent interpretation, where practic-• 
able and necessary;18 and
ensuring the confi dentiality of asylum applications • 
and the information contained therein.19
Th e third set of provisions attempts to guarantee the fair 
adjudication of claims. Here, the legislation recognizes the 
limitations of an ordinary offi  cial’s capacity to fairly apply 
refugee laws in all cases. Th e Refugees Act requires that the 
Refugee Reception Offi  cer hand the application to a Refugee 
Status Determination Offi  cer (RSDO). Th e RSDOs should be 
trained to determine status.20 Th ese offi  cers should formally 
interview all applicants, allowing for the presence of a lawyer 
if so desired, and determine whether to grant or reject refu-
gee status. If an application is rejected, the applicant should 
be aff orded the opportunity to appeal the decision to a high-
er authority.21 Th e DHA is obliged to establish a Standing 
Committee for Refugee Aff airs and a Refugees Appeal Board 
to adjudicate on diff erent categories of refusal.22
Th e fourth set of provisions provides for the temporary 
protection of applicants while their claims are decided. Th ese 
provisions are crucial in South Africa, where the police zeal-
ously enforce immigration laws and documentation of an in-
dividual’s status is crucial to prevent deportation and possible 
refoulement. When an applicant fi rst registers their intention 
to apply for asylum they should be referred to a DHA offi  cial 
who should issue them with a “transit permit” verifying their 
right to be in the country for three weeks or until they for-
mally lodge their claim.23 As soon as an individual lodges a 
claim, the Refugee Reception Offi  cer should issue them with 
a temporary asylum seeker’s permit.24 Refugee reception of-
fi cers should also renew the asylum seeker’s permit at regular 
intervals until a decision has been made and the applicant 
has exhausted all mechanisms of appeal.
To summarize, South African legislation requires the 
DHA to administer status determination in accordance with 
four linked provisions:
settlement-oriented reception of claims to facilitate • 
access;
assistance by RROs to ensure free, transparent, and • 
accurate completion of forms;
interviews and appeal mechanisms to ensure fair ad-• 
judication of claims; and
documentation to provide protection against • re-
foulement.
Methodology
Th e DHA’s failure to fulfi ll these and other procedural obli-
gations has been rigorously documented over the years by 
a number of scholarly publications and NGO reports.25 
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However, these reports have been primarily based upon 
qualitative data, including (a) interviews with asylum seek-
ers, policymakers, and service providers; (b) observations of 
practices at the RROs and at the border; and (c) reports and 
statements by public offi  cials and public bodies such as the 
Refugee Directorate, the Standing Committee for Refugee 
Aff airs, and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for 
Home Aff airs. Th is data has been very useful in developing 
assessments of key problem areas in departmental perform-
ance. It has also been helped analysts to generate plausible 
hypotheses as to why the DHA has been unable to fulfi ll these 
obligations. However, this data can not help us identify the 
seriousness of the various implementation failures identifi ed 
or measure the power of the various competing explanations 
of access problems.
In order to account for these shortfalls, gauge to what ex-
tent the DHA was fulfi lling each of these four of these pro-
cedural requirements, and discriminate between competing 
plausible explanations of the shortfalls, we have used a sur-
vey of asylum-seeker experiences. Th is survey began with an 
exhaustive study of governmental and non-governmental 
monitoring of the RROs to identify a series of performance 
benchmarks for the DHA in relation to reception, assistance, 
interviewing, and documentation. We used these bench-
marks to design an instrument that would test whether the 
recollected experiences of asylum applicants met the min-
imum standards set out in the relevant legislation. Th e ma-
jority of the questions were closed-ended, though in order 
to develop a clearer idea about (a) illegal and confl ict-relat-
ed activities and (b) applicants’ perceptions and personal 
understanding of the asylum-seeker process, we also asked a 
small number of open-ended questions. Th e instrument was 
refi ned through:
a series of workshops with lawyers and other civil • 
society partners in Johannesburg, Durban, and Cape 
Town to ensure national relevance and comparabil-
ity; and
piloting at the Pretoria and Cape Town offi  ces.• 
Th e instrument was then translated into French, Shona, and 
Kiswahili and back-translated to English to check translation 
accuracy.
Given the oft en lengthy periods that pass between fi rst ap-
plying for asylum and fi rst sitting an interview, and the po-
tential for loss of accurate recall, it was decided to split the 
survey into two parts and target two separate populations. 
Th e target population for the fi rst survey was all applicants 
who had submitted an application for asylum but had yet to 
sit a formal interview with an RSDO (hereaft er: pre-RSDO). 
Th e target population for the second survey was all appli-
cants who had sat an interview with an RSDO (hereaft er: 
post-RSDO). Given the diffi  culties in generating household 
and telephonic surveys of asylum seekers in South Africa,26 
and in securing interviews with applicants leaving the RRO, 
it was decided to sample applicants waiting to renew their 
asylum-seeker permits. A sample size of 400 applicants per 
city was chosen (200 pre-RSDO, 200 post-RSDO). Th ese 
subjects were systematically selected over a one-month per-
iod in November and December 2007. Due to language dif-
fi culties and subjects’ security concerns, Somalis, Ethiopians, 
Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis were under-represented. Given 
current trends in the fl ows of asylum seekers into the country, 
it is relatively unsurprising that most respondents were male 
and either of Zimbabwean or Congolese nationality. Th e cur-
rent paper reviews fi ndings from the survey conducted at the 
Gauteng-based offi  ces.
Evaluating DHA Performance
Supporting the fi ndings of previous monitoring and analy-
sis, the survey reveals a refugee-reception system that is not 
functioning as intended by the legislation. In part this is due 
to problems of capacity. Th e Refugee Aff airs Directorate itself 
acknowledges its inability to adequately process the number 
of claims received on an annual basis. Th is refl ects a consen-
sus position of all stakeholders, including the DHA Minister, 
senior-level DHA offi  cials, the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee, judges adjudicating on refugee and asylum mat-
ters, and refugee advocates. More important are the specifi c 
fi ndings regarding the obstructive institutional culture be-
hind these problems. Whereas previous monitoring had sug-
gested rampant corruption and/or laxity of offi  cials in enfor-
cing laws as potential problems, the current study suggests 
that offi  cials generally err on the side of overzealousness in 
the administration of status determination procedures, un-
lawfully denying access to the system and negatively prejudi-
cing applicants’ claims. Th e following discussion will support 
this claim through a discussion of the four legislative provi-
sions outlined above.
Free-settlement Oriented Access
Th e overzealous enforcement of immigration laws means that 
asylum seekers are rarely able to register their intention to 
claim asylum. Th e prototypical applicant at the Pretoria offi  ce 
enters the country without any identifying documentation 
(53% n = 226), informally (58% n = 223), across a Zimbabwean 
border (78% n = 227). Hence, even though the Refugees Act 
specifi cally caters for informal entrants, this means that ap-
plicants who do not enter at a border post will rarely be able to 
register their intention to claim asylum. Th e security offi  cials 
(police and army) they are most likely to fi rst encounter in the 
Limpopo border region have a limited working knowledge of 
South African asylum laws and regularly deport Zimbabwean 
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nationals (the majority of entrants) without calling upon the 
DHA to conduct status determination.
Asylum seekers who enter South Africa through a border 
post are better off  than informal entrants because they can 
register a claim for asylum as soon as they meet a DHA of-
fi cial. However, DHA offi  cials commonly deny applicants the 
right to register their intention to apply. Th e fact that one-
fi ft h of applicants who were eventually able to obtain their 
asylum papers noted that they were not given a permit when 
they informed offi  cials at the border of their intention to 
apply (20% n = 30) suggests that a much larger proportion of 
those who have tried never reached the offi  ce. It is also likely 
that many potential applicants do not think it is worth try-
ing to register their claim at the border. Given the unstated 
policy of denying Zimbabwean migrants the right to asylum 
at the Beitbridge border post, only one-fi ft h registered a claim 
upon entry (19% n = 79). In addition to individual offi  cials 
pro-actively creating barriers to entry, DHA offi  cials do little 
to ensure that potential applicants are notifi ed of their rights 
to register their claims. One in ten (10% n = 230) applicants 
found out that they needed to make their claim for asylum 
at an RRO. Th e majority were told by friends or family (72% 
n = 230).
Given these factors, the majority (90% n = 232) of ap-
plicants arrive at the reception offi  ce to formally lodge their 
claim without having previously registered their intention to 
do so. At this stage they encounter further barriers to access. 
Th e main problems are the quotas each offi  ce has instituted 
in order to limit the number of applications per day.27 Th ese 
quotas, which directly contravene the statutory obligation to 
receive claims, result in extremely long queues. Our fi ndings 
show that an average applicant will have to return to the RRO 
approximately three times, and wait approximately twenty-
two days between fi rst arriving at the offi  ce and fi rst entering 
the offi  ce. Such fi ndings may be taken to refl ect an unavoid-
able consequence of offi  cials’ attempts to match their lim-
ited capacity to receive applications with an overwhelming 
demand for asylum. Th is interpretation becomes less plaus-
ible when we refl ect upon the types of conditions applicants 
are forced to endure in the line. Most (60% n = 231) spend 
at least one night outside to maintain their position in the 
queue. On average, those who spent one night could expect 
to spend ten nights outside—about one of every six (18% n = 
141) doing so with children in their care. Th e line itself is a 
site where asylum seekers, many of them already victimized 
and brutalized in their countries of origin, become targets 
once again. About one-third of respondents (35% n = 226) 
reported being hurt, threatened, or robbed whilst waiting in 
the queue. Th e accompanying box off ers their accounts of 
such experience.
Question: Did anyone hurt you, threaten you, or 
steal your belongings while you were waiting in 
line? Can you explain what happened?
“I was sleeping and I woke up in the morning and I did 
not fi nd my money or my phone.”
“It was these two guys who threatened me; they threw 
me out of line and took my phone and money—two 
hundred rand.”
“People crush on you in the line and I was hurt because I 
was defending my child.”
“Someone wanted to fi ght with me; those who control the 
queue; wanted me to pay. I didn’t have any money.”
“The time I was at the surrounding area of the reception 
my clothes and belongings were taken by the Metro 
Police.”
“We were hit by stones by passers-by during the night.”
It is diffi  cult to directly link this evidence of neglect to an 
explanation of DHA offi  cial behaviour; however, it is cer-
tainly cause to reconsider whether the decision to limit the 
number of entries is purely the result of capacity issues, or 
rather a more intentioned barrier to access. Aft er all, DHA 
reception offi  cials, regardless of their rank, witness the 
suff ering of people in the queue every day when they come 
to work. Th ese doubts become more compelling when con-
sidered in relation to the apparent lack of attention that of-
fi cials give to ensuring that those who enter are able to lodge 
their claims. Having endured the queue, many respondents 
are given forms to fi ll out and told to return on a later date 
(34% n = 230), or given an appointment for another date 
(15% n = 230). Some wait without being given any attention 
at all (3% n = 230). Since long queues to access do not appear 
to accord with an eff ort to ensure that those who enter are 
served correctly, one might be tempted to assume that they 
are the conscious product of corrupt offi  cials. At least one 
study on the South African border suggests that long queues 
are oft en purposely created and sustained by corrupt offi  cials 
who wish to generate demand for illegal services to circum-
vent the line.28 Our results cast doubt on a similar reading of 
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Figure 1: Entered RSA through an offi  cial border post
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refugee reception. While a signifi cant number of respond-
ents reported having paid someone to get their papers (10% 
n = 230), doing so did not signifi cantly impact upon the time 
it took to lodge a claim.
Assisting Completion of Forms
Perhaps offi  cials are simply lazy and not motivated by any 
specifi c desire to create barriers to the lodging of claims? 
Some of our fi ndings on the assistance applicants received 
inside the offi  ce might support such a reading. Almost two-
thirds (68% n = 219) of respondents report that offi  cials pro-
vided no assistance in completing the form. A similar pro-
portion (67% n = 218) report that offi  cials did not go over 
the form with them once it was complete. Offi  cials only pro-
vided assistance to a small number (17% n = 70) of those 
who needed interpreters. When offi  cials did pay attention to 
a case, they usually did so in a manner that would jeopardize 
the confi dentiality of the claim. Applicants were oft en ques-
tioned in a public area—more than a quarter (28%) of the 
129 applicants who were asked questions by offi  cials about 
their asylum claim said that other people were able to over-
hear their answers.
Further analysis of this data off ers a more worrying fi nding: 
of offi  cials purposively negatively prejudicing claims. While 
offi  cials clearly explain to applicants what their obligations 
are, the same is not true of applicants’ rights. Most (92% n = 
228) applicants reported that they were aware of their obli-
gation to renew their permit before it expired. In contrast, 
very few (8% n = 228) reported being told they were allowed 
to bring a lawyer to their next interview. Furthermore, most 
(63% n = 228) were not aware that their answers would not 
be shared with anyone outside the offi  ce. Going beyond sim-
ply preventing applicants from knowing their rights, there is 
some evidence to suggest that offi  cials arbitrarily intervene 
in the fi lling out of forms. Th e respondents who most needed 
assistance (respondents who needed interpreters and re-
spondents who had diffi  culties understanding the questions 
on the form) were less likely to receive assistance than those 
who needed no help.
Ensuring Fair Adjudication
Th e tendency to negatively prejudice applications extends to 
the status determination process itself. In some respects we 
simply see a recurrence of the same problems of laxity in offi  -
cial performance of duties that plague the reception of appli-
cations. Offi  cials do not provide interpreters when they are 
needed and do not inform applicants of rights that will pot-
entially improve their capacity to accurately tell their story, 
such as the right of female applicants to request an interview-
er of the same sex. Perhaps more importantly, offi  cial practi-
ces put applicants in a position where they are unlikely to be 
able to accurately recount or defend their stories. Most (62% 
n = 197) applicants say they were given no advance warning 
that they would be interviewed. Th is is because reception of-
fi cers commonly neglect their duty to clearly schedule dates 
for each applicant’s interview, preferring instead to select in-
dividuals for an interview from the line of applicants waiting 
to renew their permits. Aft er having waited for months and 
in some cases years for the interview, the individual is not 
likely to be in a position to refuse. Given this, it is relatively 
unsurprising that most (88% n = 196) applicants note hav-
ing brought no evidence to the interview to substantiate their 
case. Most applicants do not receive a copy of their original 
application form. Again, there may be some reason to attrib-
ute the above problems to lack of capacity or sheer laziness. 
Th e DHA has notoriously bad information technology and 
case fl ow management systems. Th is oft en goes as far as not 
having working photocopiers or not having adequate paper 
to print identifi cation documents.29 Due primarily to the un-
willingness of staff  to adopt new information technology sys-
tems,30 there is no centralized database of applications and 
no ability to track whether the applicant has left  the province 
to make a claim elsewhere.
Again, the incompetence of offi  cials does not account for 
all of the shortfalls. While some sins of omission can be eas-
ily dismissed as the result of absent-mindedness, laziness, or 
incompetence, the failure of offi  cials to make simple conces-
sions during offi  cial hearings suggests a more intentioned ef-
fort to deny applicants the capacity to compensate for their 
lack of preparation. Most offi  cials do not begin the interview 
by explaining to the applicant the purpose of the interview. 
Th is is a signifi cant problem because the applicant has al-
ready been caught by surprise and may think they are being 
interrogated for having not fulfi lled one of their obligations 
(e.g. to maintain a valid permit or to uphold South African 
laws). Although an RSDO will usually possess a copy of the 
applicant’s original application form, most (66% n = 191) ap-
plicants are not provided with a chance to view this copy be-
fore the interview. Furthermore, most applicants told us that 
the RSDO did not go through their form with them (72% n = 
194). Given that in most cases the RSDO will refer primarily 
to the contents of the application form and in many cases 
identify problems on the form, or question the veracity of 
an individual’s story, these omissions place the applicant at a 
considerable disadvantage, denying them the ability to know 
with any certainty the reasons why they are being asked vari-
ous questions.
Providing Protecting Documentation
Th e fi nal obligation of the reception offi  cials is to ensure that 
applicants are provided with adequate documentation to 
legalize their stay in the country. As we have already noted, 
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offi  cials are generally lax in ensuring that all applicants’ claims 
are formally lodged on the same day they enter. As a result, a 
minority of applicants (41% n = 230) receive this permit on 
the fi rst day they enter the offi  ce. On average, asylum seekers 
wait a further fi ve days aft er fi rst entering the offi  ce before 
they fi nally receive a permit.
Th is general sloppiness extends to the process of issuing 
permits where almost a quarter of respondents (24% n = 
229) reported mistakes on their original permits, among 
them misspelled or incorrectly ordered names and incorrect 
birthdates.
Given the frequency with which applicants are stopped 
and asked for their papers, the scrutiny which police offi  cers 
commonly apply to asylum permits, and the potential risks 
they face of being subject to refoulement, it is diffi  cult to ac-
cept these mistakes as mere laxity and more tempting to as-
sess them as the product of a more “malign indiff erence.” Th is 
reading is buttressed by our data on the problems applicants 
experience in maintaining their documentation. An average 
asylum seeker has to renew his or her permit fi ve times a year 
and will come to the RRO more than once to have it renewed. 
Legislation does not prescribe the validity period for asylum 
permits, so it is uncertain why offi  cials, given the freedom to 
use their discretion, continue to specify, on average, valid-
ity periods of two-and-a-half months on permits. Th is prac-
tice increases offi  ce workloads in the processing of renewals, 
while promoting the social exclusion of already vulnerable 
migrants who must regularly sacrifi ce work hours and trans-
port funds in order to remain legal. Some asylum seekers 
(13% n = 217) fail to renew their permits in time due to work 
or personal commitments that prevent them from coming to 
the offi  ce, and a small percentage (5% n = 205) report having 
been arrested or fi ned for having an expired permit.
Summary
In summary, the fi ndings of this survey suggest that South 
Africa’s RROs commonly fail to meet the basic procedural 
obligations that lawmakers designed to ensure fair and free 
access to the status determination process. In some respects 
the study simply extends some common indictments of 
South African governance in the post-Apartheid era, and 
post-colonial governance in Southern Africa more generally, 
to the fi eld of refugee aff airs. Like counterparts in other areas 
of government, the Refugee Directorate in the DHA appears 
to lack the capacity to fulfi ll South Africa’s newly progressive 
laws. It is unable to ensure that migrants seeking protection 
can lodge their claims, access documentation, and receive 
fair adjudication. Furthermore, the DHA appears to lack the 
ability to eff ectively manage and discipline its junior offi  cials. 
Laxity, incompetence, and to a lesser extent corruption cre-
ate unnecessary blockages in the system and jeopardize the 
rights of claimants.
Th e fi ndings of this survey also depart in signifi cant ways 
from this general acceptance that diffi  culties in Africa in 
administering individual-based status determination stem 
simply from the fact that states are weak, fragmented, and 
corrupt. Several of the instances of procedural breakdown 
uncovered by this study suggest that offi  cials were not sim-
ply failing to do their jobs, but were collectively going out of 
their way to repel, hinder, and undermine asylum seekers’ 
capacity to receive fairly adjudicated claims. Offi  cials (a) re-
fused to register or receive intentions to apply, thereby sub-
jecting applicants to various forms of hardship; (b) interfered 
without warrant in the preparation of application forms; (c) 
kept applicants “in the dark” during interviews; and (d) im-
posed conditions to make it diffi  cult to maintain valid iden-
tity documents. Th is behaviour poses an interesting puzzle 
for further analysis. Why would ordinary offi  cials seek to ob-
struct asylum seeker claims in this way? Unfortunately, our 
survey instrument, which was specifi cally designed to cap-
ture asylum-seeker experiences, is not capable of providing 
a compelling account of offi  cials’ motivations. Ultimately, it 
is highly unlikely that these questions can be solved without 
ethnographic analysis of offi  cial culture within the DHA itself. 
In the absence of such data, I will attempt to piece together a 
plausible hypothesis. Th e rudiments of this explanation can 
be found in the historical origins of the DHA and the deci-
sions made by the Refugee Directorate at key moments since 
its incorporation. Th e essence of the argument I want to put 
forward is that the obstructionist behaviour of DHA offi  cials 
is an expression of a discretionary institutional culture that 
has become defi ned by the objective of excluding undocu-
mented migrants.
What Do We Make of Bureaucratic 
Obstructionism?
In my other writing on this subject I have emphasized the 
historic lack of capacity within the DHA.31 However, in 
41%
59%
Yes
No
Figure 2: Got permit the fi rst time entered the Refugee Reception 
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addition to its many capacity constraints, the DHA has been 
historically characterized by an institutional culture which 
signifi cantly hampers its ability to adequately administer the 
Refugees Act. While indiff erence and impunity can be the 
hallmarks of almost any government bureaucracy,32 and were 
common features of Apartheid era offi  cial attitudes,33 the 
immigration activities of DHA offi  cials have been uniquely 
structured by legislation which fostered such an attitude to-
wards clients. Immigration laws during the Apartheid era, 
which were brought together underneath a single Aliens 
Control Act in 1991, provided offi  cials with a considerable 
degree of discretion to decide how individual requests for 
immigration permits ought to be evaluated. As suggested by 
the former special advisor to the Minister, the purpose of this 
highly discretionary environment was to validate racially 
prejudicial outcomes in the language of non-racial admin-
istrative law:
If you read the Aliens Control Act and you’re applying for a per-
mit, you do not know under what criteria you will get or you 
will not get the permit. You will not know what procedures you 
would need to follow. Th e Aliens Control Act gives no infor-
mation in terms of which most of the permit categories would 
qualify for either permanent or temporary residency. In terms 
of permanent residence, there was a mechanism in place where 
… an application would come in under some general criteria of 
being a good citizen and somehow in the application of those 
criteria whatever came out were white, Anglo-Saxon, protestant 
people.34
Importantly, while the new administration has subse-
quently passed legislation that was specifi cally intended to 
reduce the degree of discretion available to individual of-
fi cials, the Refugee Directorate offi  cials began to adminis-
ter refugee laws in the context of the Aliens Control Act.35 
Furthermore, training has yet to transform the way in which 
offi  cials administer the laws. Th is has been specifi cally ac-
knowledged by the current Home Aff airs Minister, Nosiviwe 
Mapisa-Nqakula:
[i]t is sometimes very diffi  cult to get offi  cials to change their 
mindsets. It seems that many offi  cials are still stuck in the era of 
the Aliens Control Act. Some seem to think that the law means 
what they think it should mean.36
While clearly acknowledging the origins of the problem, 
the Minister’s comments do not recognize the signifi cance 
of subsequent government policy in ensuring that offi  cial 
discretion was utilized to restrict entry, instead of being de-
ployed for personal gain or avoidance of duty. Why is it that 
offi  cials appear to go out of their way, and beyond the law, to 
prevent access to asylum?
Th e origins of this answer can be found in the generally 
restrictive discourse towards undocumented migrants that 
has been formulated within the DHA since the transition to 
democracy. Within the Government of National Unity, the 
leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, 
identifi ed illegal immigration as a pressing threat to South 
Africa’s hopes of economic uplift ment for the majority of its 
previously disenfranchised and poverty-stricken population. 
His ideas live on in the current administration, and particu-
larly within the DHA Ministry, which has sought to ensure 
that migrants of various forms were not able to enter South 
African territory and, barring that, the South African labour 
market. Th is ideology also found expression in South Africa’s 
new Immigration Act,37 which set out a series of provisions 
excluding all those who would compete with South Africans 
for jobs and/or could not contribute to the development 
of South African skills or directly employ South Africans. 
However, it has also found deeper expression in the world 
views of offi  cials within the DHA, who conceptualize the 
prevention of immigration as a responsibility that goes be-
yond their legally mandated role of ensuring the sanctity of 
South Africa’s immigration laws.
Evidence of this abiding commitment to an exclusionary 
ideology can be found in the eff orts of the reception offi  cials 
to limit access to asylum. Th e fi rst such instance occurred 
in 2001 when, in an apparent eff ort to instil the “jobs-pro-
tecting” ethos of the forthcoming immigration legislation 
into the refugee system, the then Minister of Home Aff airs, 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, authorized the production of an 
asylum-seeker permit which expressly prohibited asylum 
seekers from working or studying, as one of the conditions 
of their temporary stay in the Republic. Th e DHA position 
was summed up in the minutes of the Standing Committee 
Meeting confi rming the decision to prohibit work and study 
rights:
it happens that a person comes to our country to apply for asy-
lum while he in fact is looking for a job … this was the main 
cause of the backlog that is now troubling the department.38
In the early years of refugee protection, the Department 
was already experiencing a considerable backlog of undeter-
mined applications. Th is meant that asylum seekers would 
reside legally in South Africa for months and oft en years 
without any legal means of earning a living. Th is issue was 
brought to a head in the case of Watchenuka.39 While ac-
cepting that foreign nationals did not have the right to free-
dom of trade, occupation, or profession provided for in sec-
tion 22 of the Constitution, the complainant argued that rights 
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to life, dignity, equality, and administrative justice do apply 
to foreign nationals and that the denial of the right to work in 
eff ect contravened these constitutional rights. Although the 
presiding judge did not rule on the constitutionality of the 
prohibitions, he declared the prohibition “inconsistent” on 
the grounds that the decision had not been made in accord-
ance with the appropriate procedure, i.e. with adequate con-
sultation with the Standing Committee for Refugee Aff airs. 
Th e Watchenuka case is crucial because it provides us with 
the fi rst evidence of the Ministry’s discomfort at the incon-
sistencies between refugee protection laws and immigration 
policies. It also evinces a willingness on the part of high-level 
offi  cials, and in this case the Minister, to avoid their proced-
ural obligations to refugee protection in order to privilege 
the goal of exclusion.
Th is dynamic would resurface in the 2006 case of Tafi ra40 
when the DHA sought to deny access to applicants it deemed 
to be unworthy or not bona fi de. By this time, some of the 
problems identifi ed above in gaining access to the RROs 
had surfaced. Applicants were waiting in long queues, and 
the DHA was unable to receive applications from all those 
presenting themselves at the offi  ces. In order to deal with 
this problem the Refugee Directorate introduced a “pre-
screening” system for all applicants. Th is process required 
applicants to complete an additional form, prior to formally 
lodging their application. Th e form was not contemplated in 
either the Refugees Act or its Regulations, and varied in con-
tent between diff erent offi  ces, asking applicants to respond to 
a series of questions about their reasons for applying. DHA 
offi  cials would use the forms to identify the likelihood of suc-
cess of a claim and decide on that basis whether to allow an 
individual to make a formal application. Applicants deemed 
to be unlikely to be successful claimants would be issued 
with instructions to apply for a work permit or other form 
of residential permit at an alternative DHA offi  ce. On some 
occasions the DHA went further to initiate procedures for 
deportation of pre-screened applicants. In Tafi ra, the court 
ruled in favour of the WITS Law Clinic that the pre-screen-
ing system was illegal.
While no longer formally practiced at the reception of-
fi ces, the pre-screening case is crucial because it evinces 
the support of upper-level management within the DHA 
for procedures that protect South African borders, regard-
less of their conformity with the provisions of the Refugees 
Act. Importantly, and despite the considerable evidence that 
backlogs, delays, and poor service delivery have been charac-
teristics of South African status determination since the mid-
1990s, the DHA has not only argued in favour of its rights to 
restrict access, but has turned the argument on its head, justi-
fying additional restrictions by blaming the current problems 
at the RROs on the asylum-seeker population as a whole. In 
communication with Lawyers for Human Rights, DHA offi  -
cials indicated that “they were acting in accordance with the 
Department’s policy of identifying asylum seekers who, in 
their opinion, would not qualify for asylum while queuing to 
make their asylum applications.”41 Th e Department conced-
ed that it had instituted a queue management system requir-
ing immigration offi  cers to enquire from the people in the 
queues about the purpose of their visit to the offi  ces because 
“in many instances the queues are congested by foreigners 
who queue for immigration permits or reasons other than 
application for asylum.”42 If such persons were not in pos-
session of proper documentation they would be considered 
“illegal foreigners” and arrested.
Th ese examples do not provide us with conclusive evi-
dence on the motivations of ordinary DHA offi  cials. However, 
they collectively point to the existence of an offi  cial attitude 
or mindset within the DHA that condones, or at least en-
ables, the types of status determination processes we saw in 
the previous section. Across these cases we see offi  cials seek-
ing to move beyond the mandated procedures and in some 
cases in direct defi ance of refugee law in order to ensure that 
the integrity of the South African immigration regime is sus-
tained. Th ese measures suggest the possible presence within 
the DHA of an institutional culture that endorses illegal ac-
tions which ensure that potential applicants are excluded. 
While these various forms of obstruction have been repre-
sented by the Department as ways of ensuring the sanctity 
of the reception system, it is important to note that neither 
of these moves can ensure that the ostensible targets of pro-
tection, so-called bona fi de asylum seekers are guaranteed 
access. Instead, working with a logic similar to that of immi-
gration laws, policy makers have sought to utilize deterrence 
and in some cases deportation to repel a variety of poten-
tial applicants from the reception system. It seems plausible 
to suggest that when junior offi  cials within the Department 
act with the same sort of impunity towards their own offi  cial 
obligations, their actions are more likely to be endorsed than 
sanctioned by their seniors.
Concluding Remarks
Th is paper has developed the foundations for an intriguing 
debate on status determination across the divides of the 
Global North and the Global South. By holding up the am-
bitious procedural commitments of the South African gov-
ernment to the scrutiny of a “customer survey” we have ex-
posed the range and depths of problems within the reception 
system. Previous analyses of this system have relied heavily 
on observations at the offi  ces or anecdotal reports and have 
therefore been limited in terms of their ability to explore the 
relative merits of competing diagnoses of the limitations of 
applied status determination law. Although limited to a sin-
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gle and possibly somewhat atypical case, the fi ndings of this 
study ask us to entertain the possibility that the implemen-
tation problems in South Africa may not merely refl ect the 
conventional story of state failure so familiar to the politics 
of development and so commonly witnessed in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Rather, the image of offi  cials going out of their way to 
create barriers to asylum suggests the existence of an institu-
tional culture that repeatedly undermines the eff orts of mon-
itors and other external bodies to implement reform. Using 
evidence of offi  cial policy I then argued that these activities 
constitute outcomes of an institutional culture of immigra-
tion protectionism that is prevalent within the DHA.
If we accept this interpretation, then we are forced to go 
beyond dismissing the experiences of asylum seekers in South 
Africa as the inevitable malaise of status determination in a 
developing country. Instead, we are compelled to think of the 
facets of institutional culture, including humanitarianism, 
multi-culturalism, liberalism, and a human rights ethos on 
the one hand, and xenophobia, racism, mis-directed patriot-
ism, and protectionism on the other, that may infl uence the 
manner in which status determination systems function in 
other, non-African settings. In particular, the relatively rapid 
deterioration of South Africa’s protection regime forces us to 
consider the long-term negative consequences of the current 
anti-asylum-seeker consensus in developed countries for the 
capacity of states to protect refugees.
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